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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
TEVITA F. TAFUNA,

Case No. 20090105-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77- 18al(l)(a) and 78A-4-103(2); and Utah R. App. P. 3(a).
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION
1.

Did the trial court err (and/or was defense counsel ineffective) in failing to

exclude an juror who had improper contact with a witness based on Utah's stringent rule
that shifts the burden to "the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not
influence the juror[J" State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 281 (Utah 1985), particularly since an
untainted alternate juror was available?
Preservation: The improper contact between the juror and the witness was brought
to the court's attention, R 289:3-4, although the juror was allowed to remain on the panel
and ultimately became the jury foreman. R 317. In the alternative, for unpreserved
issues, the matter may be reviewed under the doctrines of plain error, manifest injustice,
or ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah App.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

1991); State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55 at ^ 40, 82 P.3d 1106 ("'[Manifest injustice' has been
i

defined as being 'synonymous with the "plain error" standard.'"); see also Casey, 2003 UT
55 at ^f 41 (The manifest injustice or the plain error standard requires the appellant to
show that '"(I) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the
verdict is undermined.'"); see also Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, If 20, 94 P.3d 211 ("To
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 'a defendant must show (1) that counsel's
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different.'"). "When an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim cis raised for the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it
presents a question of law.'" State v. Isiah Bo1Cage Vos, 2007 Ut App 215, ^[9 (Utah App
2007) (citations omitted).
2.

Did the trial court err in not granting Mr. Tafuna's motion for a mistrial

after information - which the parties previously had agreed should be excluded, was then
improperly admitted for the jury's consideration? "We review a denial of a motion for
mistrial for abuse of discretion." State v. Shipp, 2004 UT App 40 (Utah App. 2004),
rev 'd on other grounds, State v. Shipp. 116 P.3d 317, 2005 UT 35.

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{

Preservation: Defense counsel moved for a mistrial during the course of trial. R.
294:295-296. The trial court denied the defendant's motion. R. 294:297.
STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The texts of the following relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are
contained in this brief or Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-1105(b)(1)

Utah R. App. P. 3(a)

Utah Code Ann. §77-17-11

Utah R. App. P. 23B

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(a)

Utah R. Crim. P. 170)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about November 7, 2007, the State filed an Information against Tevita F.
Tafuna, which alleged the crimes of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony; and
Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a
class A misdemeanor. R 1-4. On November 16, 2007, an Amended Information was
filed; however, the charges were not significantly modified for purposes of appeal. R. 6-9.
Mr. Tafuna's case proceeded to trial on October 22, 2008. After a three-day trial,
the jury convicted Mr. Tafuna of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. R. 203; 290:57-59. The dangerous weapon charge was
dismissed upon the Defendant's motion. R. 189; 294:326. At sentencing, the court

3
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imposed, inter alia, an indeterminate term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison. R
(

291:10.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 27, 2007, Mr. Tafuna attended a Halloween party, hosted by Grant
Wolmuth, his brother, Joel, and Mark McMillian. R. 295:11-18. Mr. Tafuna arrived with
two acquaintances, PJ Valdez and Rochelle Noble. R. 295:16.
Grant testified that people were using alcohol and marijuana at the party, including
Mr. Tafuna. R 295: 71. While Mr. Tafuna was in the kitchen socializing, a commotion
broke out in a nearby bedroom. R. 295:18. Mr. Tafuna heard someone yell something
and everyone in the kitchen started to gravitate towards a nearby hallway. R. 295:21.
Tafiina proceeded to the hallway with the crowd. R. 295:21; 295:40. Although several
people were in front of Mr. Tafuna, his height enabled him to see over their heads. R.
295:21. Mr. Tafuna saw and heard a heated argument ensuing between PJ and numerous
other individuals. R. 295:22.
Fearing for PJ's safety, Mr. Tafuna moved through the crowd to get closer to the
commotion. R. 295:22. He entered the bedroom and asked what was going on. R.
295:22. Tafuna was told it was none of his business. R. 295:23.
Nevertheless, he tried to neutralize the situation. He wanted to get PJ out of there.
R. 295:23. A male dressed as a pirate told Mr. Tafuna that he could not leave. R. 295:23.
Mr. Tafuna replied that he was going to leave because he didn't have anything to do with

4
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the argument and he was just concerned for PJ's safety. R. 295:24. The male dressed as
a pirate then reasserted that Mr. Tafima could not leave and brandished a knife. R.
295:24. The knife appeared to be a real knife. R. 295:24-25. After Tafuna's own life
was threatened, he focused on his personal well-being. R. 295:40, 42, 43.
To protect himself, Mr. Tafuna picked up a pocketknife that he found in the
bedroom. R. 295:25; 295:41. Tafuna opened the pocketknife and told everybody to get
back. R. 295:25. Mr. Tafuna then fled downstairs and out the back patio. R. 395:28;
295:26. Once in the backyard, Mr. Tafuna continued in his attempts to escape. He
located a gate, but couldn't get it open. R. 295:27. Mr. Tafuna was unable to open the
gate due to the angry mob that was following him. R. 295:27. Tafuna displayed the knife
in a defensive way to try to keep people away from him. R. 295:53-54.
Eventually, the gate opened. R. 295:29. Mr. Tafuna ran through the gate towards
his car. R. 295:29. Upon reaching the driveway, Mr. Tafuna threw away the knife. R.
295:29. However, as he reached for the car door, he was grabbed from behind. R.
295:30. Tafuna was unable to see who grabbed him. R. 295:30. His arms were locked
behind him and he was forced away from the vehicle. R. 295:31-32.
Figuratively and almost literally, Tafuna was blind-sided with a hit to his eye. R.
295:32. He could not see out of his injured eye. R. 295:32. (At the time of the trial, Mr.
Tafuna still experienced permanent damage to his vision. R. 295:33.) After being
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assaulted, Mr. Tafuna continued to struggle with his attacker. R. 295:33. He eventually
broke free and started running down the street. R. 295:34.
As Mr. Tafuna was trying to run away, he was pushed from behind. R. 295:34.
Mr. Tafuna tumbled down the sloped ground. R. 295:34. Upon regaining his balance,
Mr. Tafuna continued to try to get away. R. 295:34. A group of five or six people
continued to chase Mr. Tafuna. R. 295:35. Mr. Tafuna was thrown to the ground again.
R. 295:35. The angry mob punched, kicked, and beat Tafuna, R. 295:35, with some
discussion voiced over how they were going to attack him. R. 295:36.
Badly injured, Mr. Tafuna was unable to get up. R. 295:36-37. He was bleeding
from his eye and shoulder. R. 295:37. Eventually, the violence subsided and the mob
dispersed. R. 295:36. A male helped Mr. Tafuna get up and escorted him into the
vehicle. R. 295:36.
The State witnesses portrayed a much different picture of what happened.
Mark Buyer testified that while receiving a tour of the residence by Grant
Wolmuth, Grant opened the door to his bedroom. R. 294:18. Mr. Buyer was right behind
Grant. R. 294:18. Once the bedroom door was opened, Mr. Buyer said that both PJ
Valdez and Mr. Tafuna were inside the bedroom. R. 294:18. PJ Valdez appeared to be
stealing things. R. 294:19. Mr. Buyer also stated that the knife came from Mr. Tafuna's
pocket. R. 294:13.
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Another person near the scene, Cody Fehr, testified that he focused on PJ Valdez,
the person who had the stolen property. R. 294:44. Mr. Fehr, who had consumed alcohol
and marijuana that evening, R. 294:27, stated that PJ Valdez went down the stairs before
Mr. Tafuna. R. 294:31-32. Mr. Fehr then went into the backyard by the gate where he
saw about ten people surrounding Mr. Tafuna and PJ Valdez. R. 294:33. Mr. Fahr
thought that Mr. Tafuna was guarding PJ Valdez as Mr. Tafuna kept the crowd at bay by
displaying the knife. R. 294:34. Upon opening the gate, PJ Valdez ran to the vehicle, and
put stolen items in the car. R. 294:35. Mr. Fehr later retrieved the stolen items from the
vehicle. R. 294:35. Mr. Fehr testified that because he couldn't hold both the stolen
property and a knife, the knife slipped out of his hand. R. 294:52. After putting the items
inside, Mr. Fehr went back outside where he witnessed PJ Valdez stab Joel Wolmuth. R.
294:37. Mr. Fehr also stated that PJ Valdez stabbed TC Vasquez. R. 294:49.
Ms. Gallo testified that as Mr. Tafuna was exiting the house, he was carrying a
black backpack. R. 294:65. Ms. Gallo also stated that PJ Valdez stabbed her boyfriend
Shawn Biel. R. 294:70.
Another witness who had consumed alcohol and hallucinogenic mushrooms on the
date of the incident, Shawn Biel, testified that Mr. Tafuna came down the stairs after PJ
Valdez. R. 294:79. Mr. Biel stated that after exiting the backyard, Mr. Tafuna was
carrying a circular bag. R. 294:81. Mr. Biel admitted to throwing Mr. Tafuna to the
ground two times. R. 294:82-84. Biel kicked and punched Mr. Tafuna, R. 294:93,
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although he claimed that Mr. Tafuna still had a knife. Biel was stabbed in the back while
he was attacking Tafuna, who was still on the ground. R. 294:84-86. The State
acknowledged that the co-defendant, PJ Valdez, was responsible for the stabbings and
{

that he was charged accordingly. R 291:4.
At the conclusion of the three-day trial, the jury convicted Mr. Tafuna of
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony. R. 203; 290:57-59.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Error occurred when a juror engaged in improper contact with a witness. ff[T]he
burden is on the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence the
juror." State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 281 (Utah 1985); id. at 280 ("improper contacts may
influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be able to recognize"); see also State v.
Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("mere denial of prejudice by the
tainted juror is . . . insufficient to overcome the presumption of prejudice.").
Some jurisdictions have held that such [juror/witness] conversations do not fatally
affect the impartiality of the jury unless the defendant can show that actual
prejudice resulted from the contact. This Court, however, has enunciated a more
stringent rule in recognition of the fact that prejudice may well exist even though it
is not provable and even though a person who has been tainted may not, himself,
be able to recognize that fact.
Pike, 712 P.2d at 281 (citations omitted). Due to the unique burden shifting requirement
of Pike and the circumstances in this case, the trial court erred in not excluding the juror
from deliberations. Alternatively, Mr. Tafuna submits that counsel performed deficiently
and prejudicially in not appropriately moving to exclude the juror.
8
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Prior to trial, the parties also agreed to exclude from the jury any reference
connecting the defendant to a jacket or to identification found within the jacket because
of the unsubstantiated inference of theft or that he was in unlawful possession of another
person's property. Contrary to such an agreement, however, State witnesses later
expressly tied him to the jacket, together with the accompanying innuendos and improper
inferences. The trial court should have granted a mistrial as the parties could not undo the
damage or cure the inadmissible reference. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129
(1968) (citation omitted) ("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome
by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction

").

In a case where conflicting and irreconcilable facts were presented to the jury, impugning
the defendant's character improperly misguided the jury's deliberations and, as conceded
by the State, it would have been difficult to cure the error or to "un-ring the bell."
ARGUMENT
POINT L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EXCUSE A
JUROR WHO COMMUNICATED WITH THE STATE'S WITNESSES
It is well-settled law that, "Anything more than the most incidental contact during
the trial between witnesses and jurors casts doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and
at best gives the appearance of the absence of impartiality." State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277,
280 (Utah 1985). Such improper contact results in the attachment of a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice because it has the effect of "breeding a sense of familiarity that
could clearly affect the juror's judgment as to credibility." Pike, 712 P.2d at 281; cf. Utah
9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

R. Crim. P. 17(j); Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-11 (officer in charge of jury in deliberations
shall "not permit any person to speak to or communicate with them or to do so himself
except upon the order of the court).
As explained by our supreme court, even relatively innocuous circumstances that
involve contacts between a juror and witness are unacceptable:
In State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941 (1925), a juror rode to and from the
courthouse with one of the prosecution witnesses. The trial judge denied a motion
for a new trial because the prosecution witness did not intend to influence the
juror, and the juror, by affidavit, stated he had not discussed the trial, nor had he
been influenced in his judgment in voting on the verdict.
On appeal, this Court held that it could not "be said that appellant had the
full benefit of trial by an impartial jury and was in no way influenced except by the
evidence and the instructions of the court...." Id. at 419, 237 P. at 943. The Court
stated that one reason for the presumption is the inherent difficulty in proving how
or whether a juror has in fact been influenced by conversing with a participant in
the trial. Id.
Another reason for the presumption is the deleterious effect upon the
judicial process because of the appearance of impropriety. In Glazier v. Cram, 71
Utah 465, 267 P. 188 (1928), we held that the mingling of jurors and prominent
witnesses could not be condoned because "it is probable that a doubt must and will
continue to exist in the mind of the losing party and that of his friends as to
whether or not he had a fair trial." Id. at 470, 267 P. at 190. Accord State v. Crank,
105 Utah at 268, 141 P.2d 178, 194 (1943) ("In such instances, the verdict of the
jury, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion.") (Emphasis in original.)
Due consideration for the potential and often unprovable tainting of a juror
by contacts between jurors and others involved in a trial that are more than brief
and inadvertent encounters, leads us to reaffirm the proposition that a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice arises from any unauthorized contact during a trial
between witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors which goes beyond a
mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact. The possibility that improper
contacts may influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be able to recognize
and that a defendant may be left with questions as to the impartiality of the jury,
10
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leads to the conclusion that when the contact is more than incidental, the burden is
on the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence the
juror.
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985) (footnote omitted).
Noteworthy in the Pike opinion were the nature of the cited facts from Anderson
that warranted reversal and a new trial. The juror in Anderson merely "rode to and from
the courthouse with one of the prosecution witnesses" but the juror and witness "had not
discussed the trial." Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. Despite the apparent innocuous circumstance
of the juror and witness simply being together for a brief period of time, the Anderson
opinion questioned whether defendant Anderson "had the full benefit of trial by an
impartial jury...." Id.
The Pike factual circumstances appeared equally innocuous. The Pike jurors and a
witness did nothing more than discuss an incident (unrelated to the ongoing trial)
regarding cleaning a patio that caused him to limp.
In this case, an important prosecution witness, who was both the arresting
officer and a witness at the scene of the altercation, engaged in conversation in the
hall of the courthouse during a recess with three jurors regarding a personal
incident, i.e., an accident he had sustained while cleaning his patio which caused
him to limp. Immediately after the court reconvened, the trial court questioned the
officer in camera on the record about the conversation. The questioning was brief
and did not disclose the entire contents of the conversation. There is no other
evidence as to the scope and subject matter of the conversation since a transcript of
the post-verdict questioning of the jurors has not been provided on this appeal.
From what is reported in the transcript of the first hearing on the matter, the
conversation amounted to more than a brief, incidental contact and no doubt had
the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the jurors
judgment as to credibility. It was sufficient to warrant a presumption of prejudice.
Indeed, even if the jurors had denied that they were influenced by the encounter in
11
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the post-trial hearing, that is not enough to rebut the presumption of prejudice.
Accordingly, the conviction must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new
trial.

(

Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 281 (Utah 1985). Even with the exchange of seemingly innocuous
personal matters, the supreme court adhered to a heightened analytical standard:
Some jurisdictions have held that such conversations do not fatally affect the
impartiality of the jury unless the defendant can show that actual prejudice resulted
from the contact. This Court, however, has enunciated a more stringent rule in
recognition of the fact that prejudice may well exist even though it is not provable
and even though a person who has been tainted may not, himself, be able to
recognize that fact.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that improper juror contact with witnesses or
parties raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.
Pike, 712 P.2d at 280 (citations omitted).
The facts in Pike and Anderson are similar to the alleged innocuous conduct in Mr.
Tafuna's case. At first blush the situation may appear innocent — as suggested by the trial
court — but the heightened scrutiny mandated by Pike reveals that the juror/witness
contact here was equally improper and on par with the cited factual violations.
During Mr. Tafuna's trial proceedings, one of the jurors improperly communicated
with State witnesses about medication, prolonged waiting due to court delays, the
weather, and airport carpeting:
THE COURT:

It has come to our attention you were talking to some
witnesses from the prosecution's side there and it's something
we just can't do. So the question I have for you, I have to
look into i t -

JUROR:

Yes. Yes.
12
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THE COURT:

How did you come to talk to them?

JUROR:

Well, you know. I have got a lot of meds with me, obviously,
we were discussing it this morning. Monday when I came
through security, no problem. This morning, no problem.
This afternoon they wanted to look at everything, which is
great, it is just makes it safer for me and I don't care. But it
did make me a bit late coming upstairs.
I saw these people and I thought, well, I saw those people this
morning. I thought they were fellow jurors, they weren't. I
turned on the wrong hallway. I recall the only thing we
discussed down there - 1 got this - we're waiting there and
had been waiting. One of the first guys said, "I have been
here since 8:00 this morning." And I said, "Well, you could
be in someplace like Chicago in a airport, you know, with a
blizzard." So it's - we were discussing airport carpeting. We
realized the mistake and that's all we discussed.
Maybe two minutes, that's the entire conversation that we
had.

THE COURT:

Anything else happen?

JUROR:

No.

THE COURT:

Okay. Thank you.

JUROR:

Yes. I apologize for screwing this up.

THE COURT:

Your apology is accepted.

JUROR:

It ain't going to happen again, I'll guarantee you that.

THE COURT:

Before you leave, anybody want to ask any questions?

MR. JANZEN:

No. No.

THE COURT:

Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Thank you.

13
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(Whereupon the juror exited chambers.)
i
R. 289 at 3-4.
The above type of cursory court questioning did not rebut the presumption of
prejudice. State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("mere denial of
prejudice by the tainted juror is . . . insufficient to overcome the presumption of
prejudice.1'). In fact, the plain language of the colloquy revealed that the lower court did
not even explore whether the juror's judgment would be impaired. Cf. State v. Shipp, 86
P.3d 763, 2004 UT App 40, % 16, rev 'd on other grounds. State v. Shipp. 116 P.3d 317,
2005 UT 35.
Further, the court erred in simply assuming that the juror would likely not "be
influenced in any way pro or con[,]" R 289:5, yet it twice passed up the opportunity to
actually ask him about it. Id. The juror may have indeed felt bad about the improper
contact, but such an emotion is an issue separate and apart from the court's duty to
analytically confirm and determine whether a "biasing influence" resulted, Shipp, 2004
UT App 40, ^ 14, or whether it bred a "sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the
jurors judgment as to credibility." Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. Because of the improper
contact, the encounter was presumed to affect the juror's ability to assess the witness's
credibility, absent the prejudice being rebutted. Id. It was not rebutted here.
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This Court's analysis from Shipp lends guidance to Mr. Tafuna's case. Although
our high court reversed Shipp for a procedural basis inapposite to Mr. Tafuna's situation,
the rationale underlying the Shipp intermediate opinion bears repeating:
[One, even assuming a witness's] "apparent passiveness in the conversation^]...
the Pike rule is concerned with the biasing effect on the juror, not the witness's or
the State's fault in the matter. We have previously held a conversation instigated
by a juror to be improper and to raise a presumption of prejudice." 2004 UT App.
40140.
[Two, contrary to a State contention] "that the conversation was 'so brief and
unrevealing that no reason exists to presume the encounter affected [the juror's]
ability to assess the [witness's] credibility[,]'... the Pike rule is concerned not only
with the biasing influence on the juror herself, but also with the 'deleterious effect
upon the judicial process because of the appearance of impropriety.' Further not
only the subject matter, but also the scope of the conversation, are irrelevant in
determining whether the presumption of prejudice attaches."
State v. Shipp, 86 P.3d 763, 2004 UT App 40,fflf13, 14 (citing State v. Pike, 712 P.2d
277 (Utah 1985); State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 109 (Utah App. 1992); Logan City v. Carlsen,
799 P.2d 244 (Utah App. 1990)); see also Logan City, 799 P.2d 224 (Orme, J.
concurring) (citing State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987) ("As Erickson makes
clear, any contact 'more than a brief, incidental contact where only remarks of civility
[are] exchanged,' gives rise to a presumption of prejudice, and therefore to an order of
reversal, which cannot be overcome even with testimony by the 'tainted' juror that he or
she was not 'influenced by the encounter.'").
The trial court and the parties appeared captured by the subject matter of the
juror's explanation or even his credibility and emotion. However, the rambling,
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disjointed summary by the juror suggested that his actual discussions about medication,
court delays, the weather, and airport carpeting extended beyond "two minutes." Moving
from one subject matter to the next, unlike the abrupt lack of transition suggested by the
juror, probably involved a greater level of banter in their conversations with each side
volunteering information that kept their exchange going. Regardless, since scope and
subject matter constituted irrelevant considerations to the trial court's inquiry, id, the
court's colloquy did not appropriately address, let alone rebut, the presumption of
prejudice. State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 281 (Utah 1985) (the situation in Pike, like in Mr.
Tafunafs case, involved a "conversation [that] amounted to more than a brief, incidental
contact and no doubt had the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly
affect the jurors judgment as to credibility").
Moreover, even taking the juror's statements at face value, abbreviated discussions
nevertheless trigger "the inherent difficulty in proving how or whether a juror has in fact
been influenced by conversing with a participant in the trial[,]" together with "the
deleterious effect upon the judicial process because of the appearance of impropriety."
Pike, 712 P.2d at 280; see also R 317 (of heightened concern in Mr. Tafuna's case was
that Juror #20, who had engaged in the discussions with the witnesses, not only
participated in the deliberations, he ultimately became the jury Foreperson).
Due to the unique burden shifting requirement of Pike and the circumstances of
this case, the trial court erred in not appropriately turning to the State to deal with the
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element of prejudice. ff[A] rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises from any
unauthorized contact during a trial between witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and
jurors which goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact... [and] the
burden is on the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence the
juror." Pike, 712 P.2d at 281; id. at 280 ("improper contacts may influence a juror in
ways he or she may not even be able to recognize1'); see also State v. Swain, 835 P.2d
1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("mere denial of prejudice by the tainted juror is . . .
insufficient to overcome the presumption of prejudice."); State v. Shipp. 116 P.3d 317,
2005 UT 35 (presumption of prejudice applies where, as here, the juror/witness contact
occurred after voir dire and jury selection).
After the court's colloquy with the juror, the State suggested using an alternate
juror to remedy the situation. R 289:5. The State did not address its burden because it
was never directed to, although its suggested remedy was essentially to assume,
arguendo, that the juror was tainted and that an alternate would remove the taint and cure
the problem. However, because the court declined to do so then pursuant to the State's
suggestion, R 289:5, and again later before the close of trial at the urging of defense
counsel, R 290.-55-56,1 the issue seems more befitting of a trial court error than under an
1

When the improper juror/witness contact was brought to the court's attention, it stated, "It
has come to our attention you were talking to some witnesses from the prosecution's side there
and it's something we just can't do." R 289:3 (emphasis added). Fresh in its mind, the court
recognized that the juror was not allowed to talk to prosecution witnesses even though the court
later claimed that the juror did not "know who they were." R 290 at 56. To clarify, the juror
thought the people he spoke with "were fellow jurors, they werenft[,]M R 289:3, which did
17
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IAC classification. Of note, had such a remedy occurred, the alternate jurors expressed
that they would not have convicted Mr. Tafiina. R 290:61-62.
Alternatively, Mr. Tafuna submits that prior defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel ("IAC") in not timely recognizing or appropriately raising this issue
with the trial court. Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ^ 20, 94 P.3d 211 ("To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, 'a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but
for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the trial would have been different.'").
Counsel attempted to re-raise the issue later in the proceedings, but the trial court
declined to further consider the issue due to the earlier lack of objection. R 290 at 55-56.
In addition to defense counsel arguably inviting error or waiving the matter by not
appropriately objecting, R 289:5, the appellate review process2 was hampered because the
prosecution also was not put to its burden to establish the lack of prejudice. The above
authority reflects unreasonably deficient performance by defense counsel. Under Utah's
stringent rule, prejudice was also established as a new trial should have been granted.

nothing to detract from his improper contact with "some witnesses from the prosecution's side.'
2

Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B, Mr. Tafuna moved unsuccessfully to remand the case to
the trial court to factually address such matters.
18
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A
MISTRIAL AFTER A STATE WITNESS INFORMED THE JURY OF
PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED AND INADMISSIBLE INFORMATION
Prior to the start of trial, the State and counsel for Mr. Tafuna stipulated to the
exclusion of information that connected the defendant to the contents of a jacket:
MR. SIMMS:

The only other two stipulations that we have is we are not
going to talk about a gun that Mark McMillan had, it's not
really relevant to the case.

MR. PLAYER:

Right.

MR. SIMMS:

And then there is also a fake ID - well, people's IDs found in
that leather jacket. We won't talk about, speculate as to
whose IDs they are and what -

THE COURT:

Is that going to come out at all?

MR. PLAYER:

No.

MR. SIMMS:

No.

R. 294:174
Despite those earlier representations, at trial the State's case manager, Detective
Kodie Gill, disclosed to the jury the previously excluded information about the
identifications.
MR. JANZEN:

Okay. With regards to your investigations did you have an
opportunity to receive property after the October 27th?

DET. GILL:

Yes.

MR. JANZEN:

And what in particular did you receive?
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DET. GILL:

A couple of iPods, a cellphone, a leather coat, a wallet inside
the leather coat with several people - several different people
type IDs.

R. 294:292. Unfortunately, the Detective's statement, together with the testimony by Mr.
Marty Newbury, tied the jacket to the defendant.
MR. PLAYER:

Is there anything left in your car that was there when you got
to the party?

MR. NEWBURY: A jacket.
MR. PLAYER:

And do you know how that jacket got to your car?

MR. NEWBURY: My cousin TC went to go get my iPod - or his iPod from my
car and as he was going to my car [Tevita] was asking him
where he could put his coat. My cousin told - TC told him
that he would take it for him. And then the next day I got in
my car and it was in my car.
MR. PLAYER:

When do you discover this jacket in your car?

MR. NEWBURY: The next morning.
MR. PLAYER:

Now, do you know at that time whose jacket that is?

MR. NEWBURY: I believe it's [Tevita's] jacket. Because, like I said, he was
asking where he could put it.
MR. SIMMS:

I'll object to speculation as to whose jacket it is.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

R. 294:151.
MR. PLAYER:

I want to show you what's been marked as State's Exhibit 35.
Do you recognize this j acket?

MR. NEWBURY:

I do.
20
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MR. PLAYER:

Where did you see this jacket?

MR. NEWBURY:

The Defendant was wearing it.

MR. PLAYER:

The Defendant was wearing this jacket?

MR. NEWBURY:

Yeah, that's the jacket he gave to my cousin and my cousin
put it in my car.

MR. PLAYER:

So you saw him wearing it at the party?

MR. NEWBURY: Yes.
MR. PLAYER:

And that's the same jacket TC gave you?

MR. NEWBURY: It's the jacket TC put in my car.
MR. PLAYER:

Okay. And that is - is that the jacket that you found in your
car?

MR. NEWBURY: Yes.
MR. PLAYER:

And that you returned to Sandy Police Department?

MR. NEWBURY: Yes.
R. 294:163.
The State admitted that they failed to inform Detective Gill of the stipulation to
exclude all references to the identifications:
THE COURT:

Please be seated. First of all, how did that happen?

MR. JANZEN:

Your Honor, we failed to mention that to the officer that was
an issue that we discussed beforehand. We didn't [expect]
that to come out.

THE COURT:

Okay.
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MR. SIMMS:

We move for a mistrial, Your Honor.

R. 294:295-296. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial, R. 294:297,
notwithstanding the prosecutor's expressed acknowledgment that, "I don't know if a jury
instruction could correct this error." R 294:296.
In a failed attempt to remedy the State's lack of instruction and the prejudice
caused by the admission of the previously excluded information, the State withdrew the
jacket, State's Exhibit 35 and the court instructed the jury.
MR. PLAYER:

...[U]pon further review and consideration the State has
determined that it is going to withdraw State's Exhibit 35, as
it is not related to this case.

THE COURT:

All right.

THE COURT:

It's just the same as if it were stricken. The jacket that came
in you're not to - you're to disregard any testimony relating to
it or - to the jacket or anything that was found in the jacket.
And it's stricken and it is as if it were never entered into the
record at this point.

R 295:14.
Despite the trial court's order to disregard the jacket reference, the claimed "cure"
of a limiting instruction cannot un-ring the "ringing of the bell" or the improper
admission of inadmissible evidence. "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can
be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
fiction

" Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968) (citation omitted). "The
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fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically
ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from
the brains of the jurors. The admonition therefore become a futile collocation of words
and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defendants against whom such a
declaration should not tell." Id.
Moreover, defendant's possession of such identifications suggested more than
improperly possessing another person(s) identification, it also carried the equally
damaging label of being a crime of dishonesty. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1105(b)(1) (a
person in possession of "multiple identifying documents with knowledge that he is not
entitled to obtain or possess the multiple identifying documents" is guilty of a third degree
felony). In a case where conflicting and irreconcilable facts were presented to the jury
(and Mr. Tafuna testified), impugning the defendant's character improperly tainted its
deliberation process. State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App., 1992) (citations omitted)
("Evidence is unfairly prejudicial: if it has a tendency to influence the outcome of the trial
by improper means, or if it appeals to the juryfs sympathies, or arouses its sense of horror,
provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on something
other than the established propositions of the case."). Mr. Tafuna asks this Court to
reverse his conviction and to remand the matter for a new trial.
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POSITION ON ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is requested. This Court may be aided in its decision-making
process by the parties' participation and responses during oral argument.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Tafuna respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand
his case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this ™

day of March, 2011.

Ronald S. Fujino f
Attorney for Mr. Tafuna

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I have caused the original and seven copies of the foregoing to
be hand-delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to the Utah Attorney General's
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this %[

day of March, 2011.
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Addendum A
(Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions)
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RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Const, art I, § 12 [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole
or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any
pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery
is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l Appeals — When proper.
(1) A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery,
he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
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they have agreed on a verdict. He shall return them to court when they have agreed
and the court has so ordered, or when otherwise ordered by the court.

<

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
Utah R. App. P. 3(a). Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal
from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule
4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action
as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the
appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.

Utah R. App. P. 23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to determination of
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the
court to remand the case to the trial court for entry offindingsof fact, necessary
for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative allegation of
facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support a
determination that counsel was ineffective.
The motion shall befiledprior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after thefilingof
the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed after
oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from remanding the
case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim has been raised and
the motion would have been available to a party.
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UtahR.Crim.P. 17G)
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while the
jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the
trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a specified time.
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